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This paper studies the main drivers of revenues and expenses in non-profit 
organizations. Particularly, I focus on higher-education institutions in the 
United States, where the reliance on contributions to endowment funds and 
other donations is more significant. I conclude that the total revenues of 
non-profit organizations in the analyzed sub-sector are relatively stable from 
year to year. Furthermore, fundraising activities are critical in the gathering 
of funds. I also find that larger institutions receive a higher amount in 
contributions and spend a lower proportion of their expenses in overhead. 
According to the results, religiously affiliated higher-education non-profit 
institutions assign a higher portion of their expenditure to administration 
and fundraising activities than non-affiliated comparables. Finally, higher 
levels of transparency and accountability lead non-profits to using a higher 
share of spending in the proposed program.  





Although sometimes disregarded, the non-profit sector is a significant 
contributor to the American economy. According to “The Nonprofit 
Almanac”  (Roeger, Blackwood and Pettijohn , 2012) and to “The Nonprofit 
Sector in Brief” (McKeever and Pettijohn, 2014), the third sector, as it is 
commonly known, in 2012 accounted for 5.4% of the US’s GDP, which 
represents over $887 billion worth of output. In that year, there were 1.44 
million organisations in the sector that reported close to $4.85 trillion in 
total assets. The changes and growing importance of the sector makes it 
interesting to measure the performance of its constituencies, particularly the 
ones that most greatly influence it. 
However, the studies still show that there are many imbalances in the sector. 
For example, according to their results, 4% of charities account for more 
than 85% of the spending in 2012 and hospitals alone account for over 50% 
of revenues and expenses in the sector. Higher education is the other sub-
sector that stands out in their analysis by representing, in that year, merely 
0.7% of total number of public charities in the United States but over 11% 
of their revenues and expenses. The significant relative importance of each 
institution when compared to organizations from other sub-sectors is the 
reason that drives me to focus on higher education non-profits. 
According to Speckbacher (2003), the US government’s pressure is 
becoming more significant as charities progressively engage in the provision 
of state funded services. As of 2012, government contributions accounted, 
directly or indirectly, for over 32% of the non-profit institutions’ source of 
revenues (McKeever and Pettijohn, 2014). Therefore, I analyse the drivers 
of donations and efficiency in the non-profit sector, not only for the private 
donators, but also for the government that indirectly represents the tax-
payers. This way, these unintended contributors can understand what their 
money is being used for and the institutions can know how to obtain more 
funds. One of the most discussed metrics is the entity’s performance 




(Morris, 2000; Bennet and Svani, 2003; Wainwright 2003; Ritchie and 
Kolodinsky 2003; Ramirez and Saraoglu 2011; Cameron 1978). However, 
there has been much controversy about how to measure the performance of 
institutions that are so different from their private counterparts. The 
particularities of non-profit organizations, like their goals (such as, the well-
being of the population or the provision of education) or their inputs (like 
volunteers’ time), are hard to quantify in monetary terms which makes them 
a target of different approaches for efficiency measurement.  
Still, it is crucial not to disregard the importance of a good and effective 
governance and management for the survival of non-profit organizations. 
This study analyses the reasons for the success of some higher education 
organizations and the failure of others, focusing on their structure of 
expenses and revenues. I construct my data set based on Charity Navigator – 
an online platform that gathers information on and rates over 7,000 of the 
largest charitable institutions of the USA. The final sample includes 95 
higher education institutions, and their data is analysed over a 3-year period 
(2011-2013). Although most of these institutions are connected to 
universities, these are not the universities themselves. It comprises: alumni 
associations, endowment funds and organizations that aim at improving 
teaching, research and assisting the inclusion of any specific ethnic/religious 
group. 
The academic contribution of this study is to shed light on the discussion 
surrounding the performance of non-profit organizations, in particular the 
higher education sub-sector. I analyze not only the perceived performance, 
by looking into the drivers of the contributions, but also the actual efficiency 
with which the institutions apply the received income, by looking at the 
drivers of expenses. Ever more attention is being paid to this matter due to 
the growing importance of this sector in the global economy and, as a 
consequence, several different theoretical approaches have emerged in the 
recent years. Still there is a deficiency in the performance evaluation in what 
concerns the practical comparability between institutions. Most studies 




focus on ways to help institutions become more effective, which is highly 
specific to each organization.  
The practical contribution of my study is to provide a framework that all 
institutions within an industry can follow to better understand what drives 
their performance so that they can focus on it and improve. Moreover, I 
wish to make this subject clearer to donors so that the decision making 
process regarding the application of their funds can be more conscientious 
and aware. It is my intention that this study and its results can be replicated 
to other industries so that its conclusions may involve the complete non-
profit sector.  
Therefore, I aim at answering the following question: 
What characteristics drive revenues and expenses in higher-education non-
profit institutions? 
I divide the study into the two topics that are being analysed. I start by 
assessing the non-profit institutions’ allocation of expenses. Throughout the 
paper I refer to “overhead” as any expenses a non-profit organization may 
have that are not directly linked to the program it tries to implement 
(administrative and organizational expenses as well as fundraising expenses 
i.e. publicity, campaign printing, staffing etc.). According to Hyndman 
(1990), this measure as a percentage of total expenses “was the most 
important type of financial information required by contributors”. The first 
consideration is that the higher this proportion is, out of the total expenses 
amount, theoretically, the worst performing the organization would be. “The 
logic, of course, is that donors do not want to fund overhead; they want to 
finance programs that help people and communities” (Glassman and Spahn, 
2012).  Therefore, I start by analysing the determinants of that proportion. 
Understanding what makes a non-profit organization have more or less 
overhead may be a step to comprehending why some are able to survive and 
prosper by helping to satisfy a need in society and others are not. As well as 
it may be a help for the donors to know whether the charities they want to 




invest in are just being poorly managed or if it is inherent to the it’s specific 
type to have high overhead expenses.  
I use the concept of program expenses which is the percentage of a charity’s 
total budget spent on the programs and services it exists to deliver. The 
higher this proportion, the more efficient the organization should be.  
The second part of the study assesses the generation of revenue, because 
even if the institution excels at using its funds, if these are not sufficient for 
the proposed objectives the accomplishments are always constrained. This 
way, it is important to understand why some have funds to spare and others 
struggle to obtain them.   
I conclude that size is statistically associated with both the proportion of 
expenses allocated to the program and the revenues of the organizations. 
Larger institutions not only have higher contributions but also allocate a 
bigger share of those contributions to the program instead of overhead. I 
also find that higher-education institutions clearly affiliated to a determined 
religion tend to have more of their spending assigned to administration and 
fundraising activities than non-religious organizations. I conclude that 
accountability and transparency lead to an increase of the amount spent in 
the program as a share of total expenses. 
Regarding revenues, I find that, in general, fundraising activities have a 
positive effect on contributions. There is also autocorrelation in the revenues 
of the sample organizations. This leads me to conclude that donors are 
persistent regarding the institutions they choose to contribute to. These 
variables explain most of the variations in contributions (95.6%). 
Accountability and transparency do not seem to be considered by the 
donors. 
I start this paper with a literature review of what has been done in this 
domain and the principal results. In this chapter there are covered several 
topics which understanding, I believe, is necessary for the following of the 




thesis. First, I present a quick overview and the relevance of the non-profit 
industry. Then I identify the importance of having a performance 
measurement in the non-profit sector and the struggle to find common 
ground between the approaches. I include the advantages and potential 
pitfalls of using the financial results as a proxy for efficiency and their 
different interpretations. I also include the main differences regarding not 
only the profit driven firms but also regarding public institutions. Finally I 
introduce studies more closely related to the higher education sub-sector.  
The following section is dedicated to the research design of the paper. I start 
by stating the sample constitution and how the data collection was made and 
organized. This chapter also includes the methodology which comprises the 
definition of each variable and the prediction or expected results of their 
influences in the dependent variables. Next, I introduce the results and their 
interpretation. This chapter is also divided into sections: first I present the 
descriptive statistics of the sample and their correlation and only then do I 
analyze the proposed regressions. Finally, I state my conclusions and 
mention the limitations of this study.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The importance of the Non-profit Sector 
There are over 1.44 million organizations in the nonprofit sector in the 
United States alone (McKeever and Pettijohn, 2014). These mostly relate to 
education, health, art and culture, environment, animals, religion, human 
services or international affairs. According to a study performed by Ramirez 
and Saraoglu (2011) this number and scope of nonprofits are growing 
significantly. However, after the steady growth of the early 2000’s, the 
financial recession hit the sector and revenues stabilized (McKeever and 
Pettijohn, 2014). Still, non-profit organizations have an important role in the 
US’ economy. These contribute over $887 billion to it, which represents 5.4 




percent of gross domestic product. But the significance of the nonprofit 
sector in the economy goes further than the directly observed contributions. 
First, it is a steady source of employment. These organizations are, in their 
core, similar to ordinary institutions and as such require specialized works 
to operate. Still, a significant part of the labor force comes from volunteers. 
More than a quarter of the adults in the United States volunteer in an 
organization, summing up to 8.1 billion hours, which represents $163 billion 
(McKeever and Pettijohn, 2014).  
The notion of profit, as it is usually used, should not be applied in this 
situation, as the real importance of this sector lays on the improvement of 
the welfare of individuals. The third sector, as it is commonly known, 
“fosters social capital that, in turn, promotes economic growth and 
contributes to the healthy operation of democratic societies” (Morris, 2000). 
According to this theory, one of the most salient characteristics of this 
sector’s organizations is the positive externalities that are created for 
society. When analyzing these institutions, in line with this strand of 
literature (Morris, 2000; Kaplan, 2001), the focus should not be on the 
product they supply but rather on the externalities of the process by which 
they do so. This does not imply, however, that a nonprofit could not 
generate profits in the sense of cash surplus, only that when examining its 
productivity or efficiency this should not be the only consideration. 
The importance of performance measurement 
In this scenario, it becomes more complicated for donors to make a decision 
that is consistent with their donations’ objectives. Competition for a share of 
the available resources has lead nonprofit organizations to be keen on trying 
to demonstrate their performance, by publicly disclosing their financial 
statements. These perform an important role in sustaining public trust and 
confidence, and have the capacity to attract donations (Bennett and Savani, 
2003). Wainright (2003) notes that besides showing their performance to 
increase contributions, non-profit organizations also do this due to the 
pressure being placed on them by current stakeholders, including 




government and non-government funders, donors, volunteers, employees, 
users and beneficiaries.  
The nonprofit sector organizations in the US currently obtain close to one 
third of their income from the state (Boland and Fowler, 2000; McKeever 
and Pettijohn, 2014). According to Johnes (2006), this is the reason why it is 
“essential, in the interest of accountability, to measure the efficiency of the 
institutions which comprise these sectors". As nonprofits progressively 
engage in the provision of state funded services the government pressure is 
becoming more significant, since it has to keep track of the efficiency at 
which its resources are being used (Speckbacher 2003; Morris, 2000). 
Informed donors usually spend some time on a due diligence in order to 
adequately allocate their contribution. The issue in this case is that the 
donors are the taxpayers. Because governments make this allocation for 
them, it strikes me as important to have an easy to interpret performance 
measurement. This characteristic adds to the urge of finding a performance 
measurement that can simplify the choice of donation allocation.  
Moxham (2009) summarizes the importance of performance measurement 
by stating four drivers. The first is financial reporting: as previously noted 
there is an increasing pressure to keep regulators and funders updated about 
the firm’s performance. Donors want to be certain that institutions spend 
their contributions efficiently and that their services or products meet the 
needs of those who require it. Secondly, the study proves there is a 
significant positive correlation between the demonstration of achievement 
and increasing the funding from current and new donors. The third 
mentioned factor is operational control. This is simply for regulators to 
assure the institution is in compliance with charity law and acting in the 
benefit of the public. Finally, performance measurement is used to facilitate 
the continuous improvement of the institution itself. This last reason has led 
to the appearance of a number of performance measurement frameworks 
that take this as their sole objective.  




Differences in performance measurement between the non-profit sector 
and its private and public counterparts  
There is a consensus in the literature that nonprofits do not behave in the 
same manner as normal profit driven firms because these “lack the simple 
elegance of a financial measure such as profitability or shareholder returns 
used by for-profits” and as such cannot be assessed in the same way 
(Kaplan, 2001). The two main differences lie on the way they generate 
money and on who the customers are (Kaplan, 2001; Micheli and 
Kennerley, 2005). “In a private sector transaction, customers both pay for 
the service and receive the service. The two roles are so complementary that 
most people don’t even think about them separately. But in a nonprofit 
organization, donors provide the financial resources – they pay for the 
service, whereas another group, the constituents, receives the service” 
(Kaplan, 2001). However, even being aware that there is a difference 
between the nonprofits and its private counterparts, there is no common 
agreement about the definition of a nonprofit (Vincent and Harrow, 2005). 
Salamon and Anheier (1992) define this sector as a group of institutions 
which must share these five main characteristics: organization, private 
ownership (i.e. institutionally separate from the government), non-profit 
distributing (their owners or directors may not keep any of the profits since 
the totality of these should be put to the pursuing of the institutions 
mission), self-governing and some meaningful degree of voluntary work. 
The similarities in objectives and goals of both public and nonprofit 
organizations make their distinction unclear. Weisbrod and Dominguez 
(1986) and Feiock and Andrew (2006) argue in favor of the Public Goods 
Theory. This is based on the notion that both nonprofits as well as 
governmental entities provide services overlooked by the private sector. The 
difference however lies on the fact that public organizations satisfy the 
general public’s needs but there is always some residual unsatisfied demand 
of groups with particular interests which is eventually satisfied by 
nonprofits.  How effectively they meet these needs will, according to 




Kaplan (2001), be the best manner to measure their performance. For this 
reason, it is the author’s view that nonprofit organizations should disclose 
nonfinancial quantitative measures of the quantity and quality of the 
services provided.  
The difficulties in the definition of a performance measurement 
It is now clear that nonprofit and charitable entities play an important role in 
modern society and that it is increasingly important for them to make their 
financial statements available to the public. Without a comparison basis, 
however, donors still struggle with the analyses of those results. Sheehan 
(1996) concludes that even though most organizations have their objectives 
clearly stated most do not have any measurement to grasp to what extent 
those are successfully achieved and their actual impact in society. 
Benefactors face a big challenge because “determining where to allocate 
scarce resources is hard when there is no performance measurement agreed 
on” (Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003). Academics as well as practitioners 
have found several difficulties and so far they have not reached any definite 
conclusions (Poister, 2008; Franco-Santos et al., 2007; Bourne et al., 2000).  
In the 1980’s there was a movement towards the importance of a 
multidimensional approach to measure the effectiveness of non-profits 
(Cameron 1978, 1982; Connolly, Conlon and Deutsch, 1980; Kanter and 
Summers, 1994). To meet that need, Kaplan (2001) suggests a Balanced 
Scorecard that measures how the organization creates value in four different 
ways: in a customer perspective, financial perspective, internal perspective 
and a learning and growth perspective. However, this is meant to be a 
method of organization for the firms to improve their management and 
governance by clearly defining their main objectives, measures, targets and 
initiatives. So, the outcome of his work was a highly specific appreciation of 
how well the non-profit was fulfilling its objectives. This could be relevant 
to facilitate the continuous improvement of the institutions but it would 
hardly serve as a comparison bases between the analyzed firms given that 
their objectives would be too different to do so. Out of the four main drivers 




for the disclosure of the information pointed out by Moxam (2009), this 
process only covers the last one leaving the remaining unattended. 
According to Neely (1999), pressure to compete increases in terms of value 
rather than cost. This forces businesses to consider their performance in 
terms of quality of service, flexibility, customization, innovation and rapid 
response. However, as Glassman and Spahn (2012) suggest, good measures 
of impact are difficult and expensive to obtain. One would have to make 
complicated choices between simplicity and precision; comprehensive data 
and the costs of gathering information; comparability and individual 
performance. Nonetheless, the aforementioned authors agree that 
standardized performance measures would be very hard, if not impossible, 
to obtain. Still, they propose the gathering of information to construct 
performance standards within each program, which he called Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI). These measure the performance of the non-
profits according to the program’s outputs, outcomes and impact. Yet, even 
these are theoretically solid but practically unattainable.  
Wainwright (2003) also introduces a theory in similar lines. Impact 
assessment, as he names it, is defined as “all changes resulting from an 
activity, project or organization. It includes intended as well as unintended, 
negative as well as positive, and long-term as well as short-term effects”. 
Even considering the relevance and value of such an approach, it is rarely 
straight-forward and due to the diversity found in the nonprofit sector, very 
hard to generalize. 
Organizational effectiveness is therefore both a powerful and problematic 
concept, in the sense that it is essential for the evaluation and exposure of 
the organizations, but it can mean different things to different people 
(Kanter and Summers, 1994). Forbes’ (1998) review of the organizational 
effectiveness studies of the last decades of the twentieth century reveals that 
“researchers have conceptualized effectiveness in a variety of ways and that 
the research objectives pursued in the study of effectiveness have changed 
over time”.  He shows that when trying to conceptualize and measure 




effectiveness, researchers have tended to lean on one or some combination 
of the three major approaches. The first is the goal attainment approach, 
which is based on the assumption that organizations objectives are easily 
identifiable and unambiguous. The second approach relies on system 
resource, which emphasizes organizational resource procurement and 
defines effectiveness as viability or survival probability. Finally, there is the 
reputational approach, which “associates effectiveness with the reported 
opinion of key persons, such as clients or service professionals”. 
Therefore, assessing the efficiency instead of the effectiveness of nonprofits 
has been the most addressed way of assessing their performance throughout 
the literature. The simple question of whether a specific production process 
is efficient, that is, whether resources are not wasted, is still difficult to 
answer for nonprofits, in comparison to other private and public institutions 
(Speckbacher, 2003). The logic is that these types of organizations 
frequently have goals that are amorphous and offer services that are 
intangible or bundled (Forbes, 1998). In some cases, even the inputs are 
hard to measure (like volunteer’s time) making it very difficult to clearly 
define the metrics for their performance in a quantitative way (Speckbacher, 
2003). To this difficulty or even impossibility of measurement, Hyndman 
and McKillop (1999) add the “multiplicity of objectives and outputs; 
differing outputs at different organizational levels; and, the allocation of 
joint costs to various outputs”, to the list of major problems organizations 
trying to measure efficiency have to confront.  
Van Peursem et al. (1995) alerts for the limitations of using financial results 
as efficiency indicators. According to this study’s results, these can be 
“deceptive because they falsely convey an impression of objective truth”. 
For instance, at first, overhead costs (administrative and fund-raising) are 
usually looked at as wasteful - featuring excessive salaries, numerous 
perquisites and unnecessary staff. This leads organizations, including 
charity watchdogs and rating platforms like the one used to gather the data 
for this study, to put a negative connotation in high overhead. However, 




administration enhances organizational capacity which may be positive for 
the organizations.  Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) find evidence that 
when resources decrease, charities cut programs reducing this share of 
expenses, but when the resources increase the opposite does not happen. 
This is consistent with the theory (Chang and Tuckman, 1991) that in case 
of fiscal adversity, administrative expenses may serve as a cushion for 
organizations, allowing charities to continue with their work. These 
opposing views imply, according to Bowman (2006), the existence of an 
optimal level of spending on administrative costs, which differs from 
organization to organization. Moreover, different organizational 
characteristics and circumstances imply different costs for fund-raising.  By 
putting the focus on certain aspects of performance, other management 
activities are marginalized, creating a bias towards institutions in sectors of 
activity that are more favorable in overhead containment.  
The question of whether donors should care about overhead expenses is also 
discussed in the academic domain. Steinberg (1986) writes about the 
irrelevance of overhead ratios and argues that donors should not care about 
them because they provide no useful information about marginal costs and 
returns. He illustrates his point with the following example (1994): 
“The first budget of $10.000 will produce $50.000 in donations and 
provide a 500 percent ratio return ($40.000 actual net return). The 
second budget of $100.000 will produce $200.000, a 200 percent 
ratio return ($100.000 actual net return). If a charity wished to 
maximize the rate of return on its fund-raising investment, it would 
choose the first budget; if it cared about maximizing its resources for 
providing charitable services, it would choose the second.”   
The increased administration costs and other overhead expenses are 
therefore, according to the author, a necessary evil to gather more funds and 
provide the services the institutions are created to deliver. Bowman (2006) 
agrees that the ratios alone are meaningless but, on the contrary, believes 
that donors should care about changes in overhead ratios. According to him, 




“a change in a charity's overhead ratio correlates positively with a change in 
the price of giving, which, like any price, contains useful information for 
consumers”. Nonetheless he points out that changes in overhead ratios are 
only one of the many things donors care about, and collectively other factors 
are much more important. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned, one of the most important reasons for charities 
displaying their financial results is the gathering of funds (Moxam, 2009). 
As such, whether donors should care about the overhead ratio is not as 
important as whether they actually do care. Andreoni’s (1990) “warm glow” 
theory suggests that the act of giving itself increases a donor's utility 
independently of how his donation is used. There are other studies regarding 
the relationship between fund-raising overhead and donations but the results 
are still inconclusive. Steinberg (1986) finds no statistically significant 
correlation between the variables but Okten and Weisbrod (2000) and 
Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) reported a negative one, i.e. an increase in 
overhead expenses reflects negatively on the amount of donations.  
The higher-education sub-sector  
Similarly to the remaining non-profit sector, higher-education institutions 
have seen their trends of growth change in recent years. The revenues of the 
higher education sub-sector have grown, between 2002 and 2012, 47.8 
percent (after adjusting for inflation), to $184 billion. However, most of that 
growth happens in the first half of the period, and after the economic slump 
there is merely a marginal increase in the revenues. Even after the 
slowdown of the sector, the segment still sets itself apart from the remaining 
because it constitutes only 0.7% of the total institutions but represents over 
11% of the revenues and expenses of the sector. This comparable relevance 
of each individual institution is only surpassed by the hospitals and primary 
care facilities that account for 2.4% of the total number of charities and 
represent over 50% of the revenues and expenses (McKeever and Pettijohn, 
2014). 




Education organizations have other particularities that add to their 
importance. The future generations’ progress and development of 
knowledge is, up to a certain point, dependent on the widespread availability 
of education. Endowment funds and similar contributions gain significance 
in a time when education is still expensive and thus not affordable to 
everyone. Most innovation initiatives and research depend on funding, 
without which they would not be undertaken. While European universities 
get most of their funds from public sources, Anglo-American systems of 
higher education depend mostly on private funding (Liefner, 2003).  
Cameron (1978) conducted a study on measuring the organizational 
effectiveness in institutions of higher education. One of the main issues the 
author faces is the variety in characteristics, goals and constituencies of the 
organizations. This diversity leads to each type of institution or industry 
requiring a “unique set of effectiveness criteria”. Similarly to other authors 
(Sheehan, 1996; Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003), Cameron (1978) finds 
several difficulties in empirically assessing organizational effectiveness 
because no ultimate criterion of effectiveness exists.  However, the author 
focuses on the quality of the services they provide, like student satisfaction; 
academic career and personal satisfaction, etc.  
Others have dedicated their studies to investigating specific variables of the 
higher-education segment like the quality of graduate programs (Cartter, 
1966; Blau and Margulis, 1974) or the accuracy of ratings (Beyer and 
Snipper, 1974). The analysis regarding not the effectiveness but the 
efficiency (as in the lack of waste of resources) of the organizations, 
however, has been rather less debated.  
I intent to add to this discussion by answering the question: What are the 
main drivers of revenues and expenses of higher-education non-profit 
institutions? I am concentrating specifically on these characteristics of 
efficiency, as in how well the resources are used, instead of effectiveness. 
This distinction may allow me to perform a study that can be replicated to 
other segments of the non-profit sector.  




Finding the common features between institutions with more or less 
financial resources or with different income allocation may lead us to 
understand why some fail and others succeed. In order to do so, I formulate 
two hypotheses that address each of the components. 
Hypothesis 1: the part of available income spent in program expenses 
increases with the accountability and transparency (Governance) and varies 
as well with the Characteristics of a charitable institution.  
Hypothesis 2: revenues increase with the accountability and transparency 
and vary as well with the Characteristics of a charitable institution. 
I also formulate three sub-hypotheses. First I believe that fundraising 
expenses increase the revenues of a non-profit organization. This addresses 
the importance of marketing and determines how big its role is in a charity’s 
generation of revenues. Second, I expect to find autocorrelation in the 
generation of revenues. I believe it is relevant to understand how much of 
the institution’s ability to raise new funds, is predetermined by the funds it 
usually raises. Finally, I expect revenues to decrease with the increase in the 
proportion spend in overhead. I base this on the assumption that donors do 
not want to contribute to institutions that allocate too much of the available 




The data collection is based on an online platform called Charity Navigator 
- the largest and most-utilized charity watchdog in the United States. Itself a 
non-profit, this organization rates over 7,000 of the worthy charities in the 
USA, using a 1-4 scale where 4 is the best performing and 1 the worst. Its 
rating system focuses on two broad areas of the charity’s performance: 
“Financial Health” and “Accountability and Transparency”. Their key 




objective is to provide donors with the tools to make informed decisions as 
of their investments in non-profit institutions. This platform is the chosen 
for this study because it comprises the most detailed information about each 
institution
1
. The advanced research availability of Charity Navigator 
allowed me to find all the institutions rated by this platform within the 
industry and parameters I selected for this study. Furthermore, major 
American magazines like TIME Magazine, Forbes, Reader’s Digest and 
Kiplinger’s Financial Magazine as well as networks refer to it, approving its 
reliability. Besides having been profiled or quoted in nearly every major 
American newspaper, it has also published editorials and articles on charity 
accountability, the role of government regulation in the charitable sector, 
fundraising ethics and non-profit leadership in such newspapers as The 
Atlanta-Journal Constitution, The Chronicle of Philanthropy, The Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer and the Los Angeles Times. 
Charity Navigator assigns each charity to a category and cause, based on 
several criteria. First they use the activity code each charity has to select 
when they are filling their IRS forms within the 9 available: Animals; Arts, 
Culture and Humanities; Education; Environment; Health; Human Services; 
International; Public Benefit; Religion. Second, they assess the charity’s 
programmes and services to determine what a charity actually does and only 
then assign it to a category. Within the Education activity code, the 
institutions are divided into four broad groups: Universities, Graduate 
Schools and Technological Institutes; Private Elementary and Secondary 
Schools; Other Education Programs and Services; Private Liberal Arts 
Colleges. This study focuses in the first category, which represents the 
higher-education charities.  
The sample is composed by 95 non-profit institutions in the USA. Although 
these are not universities, they are organizations that are tied to the 
provision or facilitation of access to higher-education. These institutions 
                                                          
1
 Others like “Causes”, “Network for Good” and “Razoo” are also renowned platforms. 
However, these are best fit for donors looking for an easy way to find a specific cause and 
donate. 




include alumni associations, endowment funds that provide scholarships and 
support research and publications, as well as organizations which objectives 
that lay in improving teaching, and assisting the inclusion of any specific 
ethnic/religious group.  
The assessment of the platform of transparency and accountability based on 
indicator variables is relatively recent so this study is only based on the last 
3 years (2011-2013), to guarantee that the entire sample has the same data.  
Methodology 
In the first hypothesis, I state that the part of available income spent in 
program expenses increases with the accountability and transparency 
(Governance) as well as with the size and age (Characteristics) of a 
charitable institution. In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate the 
following model:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀 
(1) 
The dependent variable (Program Expenses) is a measure that reflects what 
proportion of the total budget a charity spends on the programs and services 
it exists to deliver. This excludes administrative and organizational expenses 
as well as fundraising expenses i.e. publicity, campaign printing, staffing 
etc. Dividing a charity's program expenses by its total functional expenses 
yields this measurement. Therefore it will vary between zero and one. 
The Characteristics category includes three variables: age, religious 
affiliation and size. I discuss them next: 
 Age – This variable is calculated by subtracting the current year of 
analysis and the foundation of the institution. On one hand, more 
years of experience should increase the efficiency of the institution, 
as it is more easily known and recognised than new ones. Moreover, 




the level of organization, knowledge and experience of older 
institutions is higher than that of new entrants to any market which 
also decreases the need for expenditures on administrative staff 
(Glisson and Martin, 1980). However, according to Glisson and 
Martin (1980), “with increased evidence of survival ability, older 
organizations may be expected to relax a bit”. Given this, I cannot 
make any predictions about the sign of the estimated coefficient.  
 Religious Affiliation (Rel)2 – This is an indicator variable coded as 
one when the organization is affiliated with a religion and zero 
otherwise. On the one hand, Wooten and Coker (2003) state that 
"generally, leaders of religious NPOs (non-profit organizations) lack 
a financial management background". I believe this may lead 
organizations with this characteristic to be less efficient in their 
expense allocation. On the other, they are also less likely to rely on 
fundraising activities (Hodgkinson, 1999). That extra portion of 
income may revert to the program. Therefore, once again I do not 
make any predictions regarding the sign of the estimated coefficient.  
 Size (LSize) – I use net assets as a proxy for this variable. Due to 
non-linearities, I convert it into million$ and take the logarithm of 
the value. Hyndman and Mckillop (1999) report the existence of 
significant economies of scale relative overhead. This implies that 
larger organizations have a lower proportion of the expenses 
allocated to overhead and bigger ones to the program. The authors 
also find a positive correlation between size and the increase in 
fundraising expenditures. This means that although expenses with 
fundraising are higher in larger institutions, the proportions allocated 
to the program is also greater. However, according to Glisson 
(1980), “human services organizations that are more highly 
centralized and formalized are also more productive and efficient in 
terms of number of clients served and the cost of serving them”. On 
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 Between brackets I include the code of each variable which will be required for the 
interpretation of the tables that follow.  




the one side, according to his study, size reports a negative 
correlation to centralization because an increase in differentiation 
(into more divisions and departments) leads to decision making 
authorities becoming more dispersed. On the other, he finds that 
bigger institutions are also more formalized because “greater size 
leads to greater development and utilization of formalized rules, 
procedure and guidelines” (Glisson and Martin, 1980). This 
contradictory relationship makes the overall correlation between size 
and efficiency, and consequently the sign of the coefficients, hard to 
predict. 
Governance has two sub-categories: Accountability and Transparency. A 
manager who is better at allocating his resources should theoretically be 
more willing to explain his actions or make all the critical data available. 
Therefore, I expect to find a positive correlation between accountability and 
transparency and the dependent variable Program Expenses, since this is 
used as a proxy for efficiency.  
Accountability can be defined as the obligation or willingness by a charity 
to explain its actions to shareholders. This is measured by twelve indicator 
variables, which signal the presence of good practices. Thus, I expect all of 
them to have positive estimated coefficients. The variables are defined by 
the Charity Navigator as follows: 
 Independent Voting Board Members (IndBoard) – The presence of 
an independent governing body is strongly recommended by many 
industry professionals to allow for full deliberation and diversity of 
thinking on governance and other organizational matters.  
 No Material Diversion of Assets (MDA) - A diversion of assets is 
described as any unauthorized conversion or use of the 
organization's assets other than for the organization's authorized 
purposes, including but not limited to embezzlement or theft. This 
can seriously call into question a charity's financial integrity. This 




variable is coded as 1 if there has been no material diversion of 
assets and as zero otherwise.  
 Audited financials prepared by independent accountant (IndAud) - 
Audited financial statements provide important information about 
financial accountability and accuracy. They should be prepared by 
an independent accountant with oversight from an audit committee. 
(It is not necessary that the audit committee be a separate committee. 
Often at smaller charities it falls within the responsibilities of the 
finance committee or the executive committee). The committee 
provides an important oversight layer between the management of 
the organization, which is responsible for the financial information 
reported, and the independent accountant, who reviews the financials 
and issues an opinion based on its findings. 
 Does Not Provide Loan(s) to or Receive Loan(s) From related 
parties (Loan) - Making loans to related parties such as key officers, 
staff, or board members, is not standard practice in the sector as it 
diverts the charity's funds away from its charitable mission and can 
lead to real and perceived conflict-of-interest problems. This practice 
is discouraged by sector trade groups which point to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act when they call for charities to refrain from making loans 
to directors and executives. The IRS is concerned enough with the 
practice that it requires charities to disclose on their Form 990 any 
loans to or from current and former officers, directors, trustees, key 
employees, and other "disqualified persons." Furthermore, some 
state laws go so far as to prohibit loans to board members and 
officers. And although employees and trustees are permitted to make 
loans to charities, this practice can also result in real and/or 
perceived conflict of interest problems for the charity. Furthermore, 
it is problematic because it is an indicator that the organization is not 
financially secure. 
 Documents Board Meeting Minutes (Min) - An official record of the 
events that take place during a board meeting ensures that a 




contemporaneous document exists for future reference. Charities are 
not required to make their Board meeting minutes available to the 
public.  
 Provided copy of Form 990 to organization's governing body in 
advance of filing (Copy) - Providing copies of the Form to the 
governing body in advance of filing is considered a best practice, as 
it allows for thorough review by the individuals charged with 
overseeing the organization. 
 Conflict of Interest Policy (ConfInt) - Such a policy protects the 
organization, and by extension those it serves, when it is considering 
entering into a transaction that may benefit the private interest of an 
officer or director of the organization. Charities are not required to 
share their conflict of interest policies with the public 
 Whistleblower Policy (WbP) - This policy outlines procedures for 
handling employee complaints, as well as a confidential way for 
employees to report any financial mismanagement. 
 Records Retention and Destruction Policy (RDP) - Such a policy 
establishes guidelines for handling, backing up, archiving and 
destruction of documents. These guidelines foster good record 
keeping procedures that promotes data integrity. 
 CEO listed with salary (CEOS) - Charities are required to list their 
CEO's name and compensation on the new 990, an issue of concern 
for many donors. Charity Navigator’s analysts check to be sure that 
the charities complied with the Form 990 instructions and included 
this information in their filing. 
 Process for determining CEO compensation (CEOC) - This process 
indicates that the organization has a documented policy that it 
follows year after year. The policy should indicate that an objective 
and independent review process of the CEO's compensation has been 
conducted which includes benchmarking against comparable 
organizations. 




 Board Listed / Board Members Not Compensated (BoardComp) - 
The IRS requires that any compensation paid to members of the 
charity's governing body be listed on the form 990. Furthermore, all 
members of the governing body need to be listed whether or not they 
are compensated. It is not unusual for some members of the board to 
have compensation listed. The executive director of the organization 
frequently has a seat on the board, for instance, and is compensated 
for being a full time staff member. However, it is rare for a charity to 
compensate individuals only for serving on its Board of Directors. 
Although this sort of board compensation is not illegal, it is not 
considered a best practice. 
The second sub-category of Governance is Transparency, which can be 
defined as an obligation or willingness by a charity to publish and make 
available critical data about the organization. This is measured via five 
indicator variables, coded as one in the presence of good practices. Thus, I 
expect all of them to have positive estimated coefficients. The variables are 
defined by the Charity Navigator as follows: 
 Donor Privacy Policy (DonPriv) - Donors have expressed extreme 
concern about the use of their personal information by charities and 
the desire to have his information kept confidential. The sale of lists 
for telemarketing and the mass distribution of "junk mail," among 
other things, can be minimized if the charity assures the privacy of 
its donors. Privacy policies are assigned to one of the following 
categories: 
o 0 - This charity does not have a written donor privacy policy 
in place to protect their contributors' personal information. 
o 1 - This charity has a written donor privacy policy published 
on its website, which states unambiguously that (1) it will not 
sell, trade or share a donor's personal information with 
anyone else, nor send donor mailings on behalf of other 
organizations or (2) it will only share personal information 




once the donor has given the charity specific permission to 
do so. 
 Board Members Listed (Board) - Our analysts check to see if the 
charity lists Board members on its website. Publishing this 
information enables donors and other stakeholders to ascertain the 
make-up of the charity's governing body. This enables stakeholders 
to report concerns to the Board. 
 Audited Financials (AudFin) – Charity Navigator checks the 
charity's website to see if it has published its audited financial 
statements for the fiscal year represented by the most recently filed 
IRS Form 990. It is important for donors to have easy access to this 
financial report to help determine if the organization is managing its 
financial resources well. 
 Form 990 (F990) - We check the charity's website to see if it has 
published its most recently filed IRS Form 990 (a direct link to the 
charity's 990 on an external site is sufficient). It is important for 
donors to have easy access to this financial report to help determine 
if the organization is managing its financial resources well. 
 Key staff listed (KStaff) - It is important for donors and other 
stakeholders to know who runs the organization day-to-day. Charity 
Navigator does not cross-check the leadership listed on the website 
with that reported on the Form 990 because the latter often isn't 
available until more than a year after the charity's fiscal year ends. In 
that time, the charity's leadership may have changed and the charity 
typically reflects those more recent changes on the website.  In other 
words, since the Form 990 isn't especially timely, it cannot be used 
to verify the leadership information published on the charity's site. 
In the second hypothesis, I state that revenues increase with the 
accountability and transparency and vary as well with the Characteristics of 
a charitable institution. I also formulate three sub-hypotheses: fundraising 
expenses increase the revenues of a non-profit organization; there is 
autocorrelation in the generation of revenues; and revenues decrease with 




the increase in the proportion spent in overhead. In order to test the second 
hypothesis as well as the three sub-hypotheses, I estimate the following 
model: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
+∝3 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝜀 
(2) 
The dependent variable in this regression is the value of revenues of the 
institution, which serves as a proxy for the ability or efficiency of a firm to 
gather funds. Similarly to size, I also take the logarithm of this variable.  
The characteristics category is divided into the same 3 variables: age, 
religious affiliation and size, which are defined in the previous section. The 
expectations regarding their relationship with the revenues are the 
following: 
 Age - An older institution should be more recognized by the public, 
possibly increasing its ability to gather funds. However, older 
institutions are expected to rely on this fact and be less aggressive in 
marketing and publicity (Glisson, 1980). Therefore it is not clear 
how the age of an organization influences its fund raising abilities 
and I make no predictions of the sign of the estimated coefficient. 
 Religious Affiliation (Rel) – If only people that share the same 
religious values donate to such institutions, this should have a 
negative impact on revenues. However, according to the literature 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Ben-Ner, 1994), the predicted donation per 
donor is higher; so once again, the outcome is hard to predict. 
 Size (LSize) - According to Hyndman and Mckillop (1999), size has 
a positive correlation to the increase in marketing expenses which 
should increase the probability of generating additional income. 




Besides, the bigger the institution the bigger the required donations 
to survive. This leads me to predict a positive relation between 
revenues and size and therefore a positive sign for the coefficients.  
Governance, as well as its two sub-categories (Accountability and 
Transparency), is described above. I expect them have a positive influence 
on the institution’s ability to collect funds right now and in the future, i.e. its 
revenues.   
I recall that the three sub-hypotheses proposed are: fundraising expenses 
increase the revenues of a non-profit organization; there is autocorrelation in 
the generation of revenues; and revenues decrease with the increase in the 
proportion spends in overhead. The independent variables used to assess the 
proposed sub-questions are the following: 
 Revenues(t-1) (LRev1) - is a lag variable and it is included in the 
Revenues regression to control for autocorrelation. I use the 
logarithm, as in Revenues. I expect it to have a positive correlation 
to the institutions’ current revenues because I anticipate some 
consistency in this matter, i.e. an institution that in the previous year 
had $1 million is expected to have more revenues this year than one 
that only had $100. 
 Fundraising Expenses (LFund) - This measure reflects the logarithm 
of the amount spent by a charity to raise money. Fundraising 
expenses can include campaign printing, publicity, mailing, and 
staffing and costs incurred in soliciting donations, memberships, and 
grants. The purpose of incurring in these expenses is increasing 
revenues. Therefore, I expect a positive sign in the predicted 
coefficient. 
 Overhead (Ovhd) – This variable reflects a proportion of the 
expenses not spent in the program. It is calculated as one minus 
programme expenses. Thus, it varies between zero and one. I expect 
this variable to have a negative impact on Revenues since donors 




want to fund the projects the institutions propose to accomplish and 
not other type of expenses, however necessary these may be 
(Glassman and Spahn, 2012).   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of main variables.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of variables in USD ($millions) 
As can be seen in Table 1, the average size is over $2.7 billion but this 
variable ranges from $4.6 million to $36.6 billion. Revenues had a mean of 
$1.08 billion. When I compare this to the revenues of the previous year, I 
find that these have been increasing. Fundraising expenses amount, on 
average, to $88.8 million, representing 8.2% of revenues.  
Given the high standard deviations reported above, I do a more detailed 
analysis of the variables. In figure 1, I show the distribution of the variables 
Size and Revenues. The figure shows that the institutions that constitute the 
sample of the study are not homogeneous and do not follow a normal 
distribution. The high skewness and kurtosis of the variable Size, in 
particular, indicates disparities in the sample. In fact, approximately 75% of 
the sample is constituted by small institutions, with assets worth close to $2 
billion. The observation with the largest value, however, has a size of $36.6 
billion.  The same, although in a less pronounced way, happens to the 
variable Revenues. In Table a) and Table b) of the Appendix I present 
further detail of the descriptive statistics of these variables.  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Size 2711.0 5088.2 4.58 36635.01 
Revenues 1078.6 1300.4 1.55 7766.48 
Revenues (t-1) 983.1 1196.7 1.55 7766.48 
Fundraising Expenses 88.8 113.4 0 1009.642 




Figure 1: Distribution of the variables Size and Revenues (in $.000) 
I proceed by presenting the table of summary statistics of all the variables, 
as used in the equations. I divide Table 2 into four groups: The first three 
include variables that are common to both regressions and the fourth is 
where I present the dependent variables and the variables required to 
address the sub-hypothesis.  
The first sector of Table 2 (characteristics category) presents data on Age, 
Religious Affiliation and Size (logarithm). The average age of the 
institutions is approximately 140 years and only about 24% are affiliated to 
any particular religion. The distribution of the variable Size has been 
analyzed above.  
In the second sector of Table 2, I present the distribution of the 
accountability variables. As can be seen, most of these are present in more 
than 90% of the sample, except for the variables: “Does Not Provide 
Loan(s) to or Receive Loan(s) From related parties” and “Records Retention 
and Destruction Policy” which are only present 66.3% and 86.7% of the 
observations, respectively. It is also relevant to notice that two of the 
variables are always present. Given that they do not induce variation in the 
analysis, from this point onwards, I ignore the variables: “Documents Board 
Meeting Minutes” and “CEO listed with salary”.  
  
 





Table 2: Summary Statistics of the variables in the sample 
The transparency variables (Donor Privacy Policy, Board Members Listed, 
Audited Financials, Form 990 and Key Staff), in Table 2, present more 
variation. Most of the institutions have their board members (89.1%) as well 
as their key staff (94.7%) listed. However, most of the analyzed 
organizations do not provide to the donors an easy access of their latest 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age Age 139.916 58.972 9 376 
Religious Affiliation Rel 0.242 0.429 0 1 
Log (Size) LSize 6.768 1.620 1.521 10.509 
Independent Voting Board Members IndB 0.996 0.059 0 1 
No Material diversion of assets MDA 0.972 0.165 0 1 
Audited financials prepared by 
independent accountant 
IndAud 0.993 0.084 0 1 
Does Not Provide Loan(s) to or 
Receive Loan(s) From related parties 
Loans 0.663 0.473 0 1 
Documents Board Meeting Minutes Minute 1.000 0.000 1 1 
Provided copy of Form 990 to 
organization's governing body in 
advance of filing 
CopyF 0.916 0.278 0 1 
Conflict of Interest Policy CI 0.982 0.132 0 1 
Whistleblower Policy WbP 0.947 0.224 0 1 
Records Retention and Destruction 
Policy 
RDP 0.867 0.341 0 1 
CEO listed with salary CEOS 1.000 0.000 1 1 
Process for determining CEO 
compensation 
CEOC 0.979 0.144 0 1 
Board Listed / Board Members Not 
Compensated 
BComp 0.940 0.237 0 1 
Donor Privacy Policy DonPriv 0.407 0.492 0 1 
Board Members Listed BList 0.891 0.312 0 1 
Audited Financials AudFin 0.509 0.501 0 1 
Form 990 F990 0.105 0.307 0 1 
Key staff listed KStaff 0.947 0.224 0 1 
Program Expenses PExp 0.858 0.078 0.524 0.971 
Overhead Ovhd 0.142 0.078 0.030 0.048 
Log (Fundraising Expenses) LFund 3.615 1.709 -1.904 0.917 
Log (Revenues) LRev 6.127 1.632 0.441 8.958 
Log (Revenuest-1) LRev1 6.036 1.622 0.441 8.958 




filling of the form 990 (only 10.5%). Close to half provide easy access to 
the latest financial statements (50.9%) and only 40.7% are clear on their 
website about their donor privacy policy.  
Table 2 also reveals that, on average, higher-education institutions allocate 
85.8% of their expenses to the program they exist to provide. This variable 
ranges from 52.4% to 97.1% of expenses. Thus, these organizations spend 
on average 14.2% of their total spending in administration or fundraising 
activities. In figure 2, I analyze the distribution of Program Expenses, which 
has a negative skewness. In fact,75% of the sample employs more than 80% 
of the money available into the program, but  5% still do not use more than 
70% of their resources with the program. Further analysis on the distribution 






Figure 2: Distribution of the variable Program Expenses 
In table 3, I present a correlation matrix where the most significant results 
are highlighted in bolt (significant at the 1% level). We can see that there is 
a significant positive correlation between the age of an organization and the 
variables Size, Revenues, Fundraising Expenses and Program Expenses. 
This means that, older institutions tend to be bigger, have higher revenues, 
and spend a higher amount in fundraising but a lower proportion of their 
expenses in overhead. Religious affiliation has a significant negative 
correlation with Size, Program Expenses and Revenues. Therefore, a non-
profit institution with a clear religious influence tends to be smaller, have 




lower revenues and employ a smaller portion of its expenses into the 
program (and thus, more into overhead).  
It is also interesting to note in Table 3 that the two main dependent variables 
of this study are significantly positively correlated (0.65). This indicates that 
usually, organizations with higher revenues allocate a lower proportion of 
their expenses to overhead and a greater one to the program.  
Table 3: Correlation Matrix (Bold – correlation significant at the 1% level) 
Estimation of Models  
In table 4, I present the results of estimating my first model, where the value 
of program expenses is the dependent variable.  
When analyzing the results for the institution’ characteristics we see that 
only size and religious affiliation are associated with the value of program 
expenses. The fact that an institution is bigger has a statistically significant 
positive influence on the proportion of expenses allocated to the program.  
This is aligned with Hyndman and Mckillop’s (1999) findings which 
indicate the existence of economies of scale regarding non-charitable 
expenses (overhead) over total expenses. This study (Hyndman and 
Mckillop, 1999), also reports that bigger institutions spend higher mounts 
on fundraising activities which is also consistent with my results 
(correlation between LFund and LSize of 0.7), presented in Table 3.  
The dissimilarity of results when comparing to Glisson’s (1980) 
formalization and centralization theory may derive from the difference of 
 
Age Rel LSize PExp LFund LRev Ovhd 
Age 1 
     
 
Rel -0.07 1 
    
 
LSize 0.61 -0.25 1 
   
 
PExp 0.33 -0.25 0.52 1 
  
 
LFund 0.46 -0.14 0.70 0.65 1 
 
 
LRev 0.51 -0.28 0.88 0.65 0.80 1  
Ovhd -0.33 0.26 -0.52 -1 -0.64 -0.65 1 




concepts of efficiency used. While I use the ratio of program expenses over 
total expenses as a proxy, the author defines efficiency as the number of 
clients served and the cost of serving them. In the case of higher education 
non-profits, this definition may not be so easily applied and probably no 
even the most accurate.  
Table 4: Program Expenses regression
3
. 
There is also evidence, in Table 4, that the institutions that are affiliated to a 
religion have less expenditure allocated to the program, i.e. spend a higher 
proportion of their budget in fund-raising activities and administrative 
doings. Theoretically, the fact that an institution has some religious 
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 The model is defined by equation (1).   
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 Expectation 
  Program Expenses  
(1) 
Age ? -0.000 
Rel ? -0.028** 
LSize ? 0.023*** 
IndB + -0.016 
MDA + -0.008 
IndAud + -0.022 
Loans + -0.007 
CopyF + -0.004 
CI + -0.071 
WbP + 0.064* 
RDP + 0.010 
CEOC + -0.014 
BComp + -0.006 
DonPriv + 0.023* 
BList + 0.024 
AudFin + -0.006 
F990 + -0.020 


















foundation or values should not influence how well their funds are applied. 
However, the results show that there is a significant difference between 
religious and non-religious organizations, corroborating Wooten and Coker 
(2003) assumption that the leaders of religious non-profit organizations 
were not always financially literate. However, there are other possible 
explanations for this negative influence of the affiliation on the proportion 
of program expenses. For example, the decision making department may 
simply chose to apply a larger part of their available income into overhead 
or, in some account, this may even be justified by what is considered by 
each institution as a program expense. One of the almost constantly present 
goals of religious institutions is the transmission of the values of their faith. 
If the expenditures in doing so are not considered as direct program 
expenses then these institution have an extra liability when compared to the 
remaining organizations. 
In what concerns the governance variables, results indicate that only two 
variables are positively associated with our dependent variable: the fact that 
an institution has a whistleblower policy and a donor privacy policy easily 
accessible, as was previously expected.  
In Table 5, I isolate the influence of each group of independent variables. 
This reveals that when the accountability variables are considered 
independently (in column (3)), two variables are statistically significant. 
However, once all the groups are included, the variable “receive loan from 
related parties” loses its significance probably due to its correlation to one 
of the remaining variables. If we consider the only remaining significant 
variable amongst this group as a proxy for accountability, we can conclude 
that it increases the proportion of program expenses which was already 
expected. According to the Charity Navigator:  
“Generally speaking, charities that follow best practices in governance, 
donor relations and related areas are less likely to engage in unethical or 
irresponsible activities. Therefore, the risk that charities would misuse 
donations should be lower than for charities that don't adopt such practices.”  




In the Transparency group, considering the only significant variable, donor 
privacy policy, I determine that this variable also has a positive influence on 
Program expenses. Also according to the Charity Navigator: 
“(…) charities that are accountable and transparent are more likely to 
act with integrity and learn from their mistakes because they want 
donors to know that they're trustworthy.” 
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 *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 Program Expenses 












-0.051   
MDA 
 
-0.031   
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-0.005   
Loans 
 
-0.034***  -0.004 
CopyF 
 
0.005   
CI 
 
-0.070   
WbP 
 
0.089**  0.046** 
RDP 
 
-0.014   
CEOC 
 
-0.033   
BComp 
 




















N 285 285 285 285 
R-sq 0.29 0.09 0.063 0.325 
adj. R-sq 0.282 0.057 0.046 0.310 




Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of the revenues model. 
Table 6: Log (Revenues) regression
5 
Regression (1) tests hypothesis 2. It shows the influence of the 
characteristics, accountability and transparency in the institutions’ revenues. 
At the 1% level of confidence only Size has a statistically significant 
association with revenues. As would be expected, the association is positive. 
Larger institutions only became so with large donations in the past. As such, 
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 The model is defined by equation (2).   
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LRev1 +  0.892*** 0.767*** 0.745*** 
Ovhd -  -0.012 -0.193 -0.182 
LFund +  0.107*** 0.104*** 0.114*** 
Age ? -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
Rel ? -0.259*  -0.065 -0.072 
LSize + 0.849***  0.145*** 0.158*** 
IndB + -0.412   -0.369 
MDA + -0.735**   -0.152 
IndAud + -0.345   0.032 
Loans + -0.182   0.017 
CopyF + 0.057   0.019 
CI + -0.593   -0.216 
WbP + 0.432   0.058 
RDP + 0.052   0.029 
CEOC + -0.232   0.041 
BComp + -0.039   0.104 
DonPriv + -0.023   -0.021 
BList + 0.446**   0.027 
AudFin + 0.030   0.012 
F990 + -0.400*   -0.103 
KStaff + -0.465   -0.118 
_cons 
 
2.580* 0.359* 0.255 0.833 
      
N  285 285 285 285 
R-sq  0.806 0.953 0.957 0.959 
adj. R-sq  0.792 0.952 0.957 0.956 




the more contributions an organization previously had, the more likely it is 
that revenues are going to remain relatively proportional to its size.  
Religious affiliation is once again statistically significant and has a negative 
coefficient. This outcome indicates that the mentioned characteristic is 
restrictive in what comes to donations, i.e. while institutions not directly 
linked to any religion attract all sorts of donors; religiously affiliated ones 
tend to only attract specific contributions. 
It is also noticeable, in this column (1), that institutions that do not have any 
material diversion of assets, tend to have lower revenues. I recall that this 
variable is quoted as one if there has been no unauthorized conversion or 
use of the organizations assets, including but not limited to theft or 
embezzlement.  
Finally, still looking into Table 6, the influence of transparency in the 
revenues is contradictory. The only statistically significant variables are 
whether or not the institution as its board members listed and if there is easy 
access to the 990 Form. It was expected that contributors would donate 
more if the firm is transparent because it provides them with confidence that 
their money is being used adequately. However, by looking into the 
statistically significant coefficients, the first variable has a positive outcome 
in revenues and the second variable has a negative one.   
I continue the analysis looking into column (2) of Table 6. Here I isolate the 
influence of the proposed sub-hypothesis. It can be concluded by the 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) coefficient of LRev1 (0.892) that 
there is autocorrelation in the organizations revenues. This means that the 
revenues of the previous year are positively associated with the current 
year’s revenues. This fact may be justified by the relative regularity of 
donations, i.e. donors are relatively constant when it comes to the institution 
they give their money to. 




Fundraising expenses also have a significant positive impact on revenues. 
The intuition behind the now confirmed anticipated results is that if an 
institution increases the marketing and other fundraising expenses, it is more 
efficient in attracting further donors and therefore increase revenues.  
Contrary to what was expected, the proportion of expenses allocated to 
overhead does not significantly impact the institutions ability to raise 
contributions. As can be seen by the R-square, the changes in these 
variables alone, account for 95.3% of the variations in the revenues. 
In column (3) of Table 6, I add to the previous group the influence of the 
characteristics of the organizations (Age, Size and Religious affiliation). As 
can be seen by the adjusted R-square, together, these variables explain 
95.7% of the dependent variable.  
Finally, I construct a last regression with all the tested variables and the 
result is an adjusted R-square of 0.956. This is a lower value than the one of 
the previous regression because this measure penalizes the inclusion of extra 
variables.  
Accountability seems to no longer be relevant for the gathering of revenues. 
This study suggests no apparent statistically significant causal relationship 
between this group of variables and the dependent variable once all the 
independent variables are plugged. This does not show that accountability is 
not relevant for the efficiency of an organization. Fist, this occurrence may 
be justified with the fact that the donors do not consider accountability 
relevant when making contributions. Second, it may be because this 










In this study I use regression models to examine what are the characteristics 
of the higher-education institutions that are most valued by donors and 
which of these influence their expense allocation the most.   
Regarding the proportion of total available income spent directly on 
charitable purposes, my findings go in line with the ones of Wise (1997) and 
Hyndman and McKillop (1999). According to the data, larger charities 
spend a lower portion of their available income in overhead and a higher 
one on the program they exists to deliver. I also find that higher-education 
institutions clearly affiliated to a determined religion tend to have more of 
their spending assigned to administration and fundraising activities than 
non-religious organizations. Furthermore, I conclude that accountability and 
transparency increase the portion of expenses allocated to the program.  
Regarding revenues, I find that the autocorrelation and fundraising expenses 
explain most of the variations in contributions (95.6%). The results allow 
me to conclude that an increase in the expenses with publicity, and general 
fundraising activities, does have a positive effect on the contributions of that 
charity. The autocorrelation leads me to conclude that donors are persistent 
regarding the institutions they choose to contribute to. Also, the size of the 
non-profit organization proves to be relevant. I conclude that larger 
organizations are more recognized by the donors and thus receive more 
contributions. Accountability and transparency do not seem to be perceived 
by the donors.  
This study has a practical component directed at the non-profit 
organizations. I provide the reader with an insight regarding the main 
drivers of contributions in the higher-education sector. Therefore, these 
conclusions may help in the definition of objectives and goals to increase 
the gathering of funds. Moreover, I also aim at helping donors make a more 
conscientious choice. I contribute with information regarding what are the 
common characteristics of firms that spend a lower proportion of their 




available income on overhead. By looking into these characteristics a donor 
can evaluate which organizations apply their revenues most effectively. 
The results of this study have to be carefully analyzed. I focus this analysis 
on efficiency, as in whether resources are being wasted. It is important to 
bear in mind the difference between efficiency and effectiveness. As 
Hyndman and Mckillop (1999) raise awareness for, “there is no necessary 
connection between the amount of resources spent on direct charitable 
activities and the quality and quantity of the services rendered by the 
charity”. But the relationship is significant enough to be useful, since in the 
most extreme scenario if there are no resources it is very unlikely any 
services are provided. 
There are a number of other research areas that could be covered. First, this 
study solely focuses on higher-education non-profit organizations from the 
United States. This method could be extended to other industries, 
geographical areas and observe if the results still apply. One could also see 
the evolution of these variables and their drivers throughout time.  
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Table a: Detailed Descriptive Statistics of the variable Revenues 
 
 






Percentiles Smallest     
1% 1.661095 1.554131   
  5% 7.940095 1.655036   
  10% 70.90196 1.661095   Number of Obs. 285 
25% 231.3303 4.446914   Sum of Weight 285 
   
  
  50% 519.7039 
 
  Mean 1078.586 
  
Largest   Std. Dev. 1300.446 
75% 1229.388 5179.912   
  90% 3194.799 5330.197   Variance 1691159 
95% 3827.483 5385.669   Skewness 1.849181 
99% 5330.197 7766.478   Kurtosis 6.370991 
Size 
Percentiles Smallest     
1% 4.693983 4.575053   
  5% 49.05981 4.671769   
  10% 119.8395 4.693983   Number of Obs. 285 
25% 337.078 20.8504   Sum of Weight 285 
   
  
  50% 917.2122 
 
  Mean 2711.033 
  
Largest   Std. Dev. 5088.246 
75% 2155.771 23505.42   
  90% 7477.67 30748.87   Variance 2.59E+07 
95% 10558.7 35477.39   Skewness 3.824292 
99% 30748.87 36635.01   Kurtosis 20.54903 




Table c: Detailed Descriptive Statistics of the variable Program Expenses 
Program Expenses 
Percentiles Smallest     
1% 0.558 0.524   
  5% 0.696 0.535   
  10% 0.763 0.558   Number of Obs. 285 
25% 0.844 0.558   Sum of Weight 285 
   
  
  50% 0.878 
 
  Mean 0.858379 
  
Largest   Std. Dev. 0.078368 
75% 0.906 0.959   
  90% 0.933 0.96   Variance 0.006142 
95% 3827.483 5385.669   Skewness 1.849181 
99% 5330.197 7766.478   Kurtosis 6.370991 




Table d: Correlation Matrix (Bold - significance 5% 
 
Age Relg Size IndB MDA IndA Loans CopyF CI WbP RDP CEOC BComp DPriv BList AudF F990 KStaff PExp Rev Rev1 Fund 
Age 1 
                    
 
Relg -0.07 1 
                   
 
Size 0.57* -0.18* 1 
                  
 
IndB 0.02 0.03 0.02 1 
                 
 
MDA -0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 1 
                
 
IndA 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1 
               
 
Loans -0.17* 0.02 -0.37* -0.04 0.06 0.03 1 
              
 
CopyF 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.14 1 
             
 
CI 0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 1 
            
 
WbP 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.57* 1 
           
 
RDP 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 0.14 0.34* 0.60* 1 
          
 
CEOC 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.40* 0.35* 0.18* 0.09 1 
         
 
BComp 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.24* -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.04 1 
        
 
DPriv 0.12 0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.26* -0.18* 0.00 1 
       
 
BList 0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.11 -0.04 -0.05 1 
      
 
AudF 0.14 -0.13 0.06 -0.06 -0.17* 0.00 -0.20* 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.1 1 
     
 
F990 -0.16* 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.13 0.0 0.20* 1 
    
 
KStaff 0.19* -0.12 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.47* 0.24* 0.08 1 
   
 
PExp 0.33* -0.25* 0.19* -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.21* 0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.15 0.08 -0.13 0.16* 1 
  
 
Rev 0.41* -0.22* 0.66* 0.01 -0.25* 0.04 -0.41* 0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.10 0.10 0.11 -0.09 0.09 0.33* 1 
 
 
Rev1 0.35* -0.21* 0.54* 0.01 -0.26* 0.04 -0.39* 0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.12 0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.09 0.33* 0.83* 1  
Fund 0.28* -0.09 0.30* 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.19* 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.10 0.11 -0.03 -0.07 0.12 0.32* 0.59* 0.40* 1 
